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TOP SECRET

	SUMMARY	
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA	
3.	Iran reportedly to authorize note issue increase (page 4).	
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6.	Ambassador Caffery analyzes Egyptian situation (page 5).	
6.	WESTERN EUROPE	
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	WESTERN EUROPE	<b>).</b>



	The Iranian Government has authorized the Iranian National Bank to issue "up to about 20 percent additional currency," amounting to the equivalent of approximately \$50,000,000 An attempt will be made to main-
tain secrecy	to avoid an adverse effect on public morale.
posed any no country's fut	Comment: There is a deep-seated fear in ap money" and the Governor of the National Bank has opte expansion which would "shake confidence in the ture." He also intimated that any such move would indicate ernment had given up hope of an early income from abroad.
dilemma in i ment obligati	The Iranian Government is faced with a its attempts to finance salary payments and other governions.

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6	. Ambassador Caffery analyzes Egyptian situation:	
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The Ambassador warns, nevertheless, that the Egyptian military may be unable to control the forces it has released and that it may change its present objectives. Such possibilities may be decreased, he adds, by a constructive United States approach, particularly in the technical assistance field.

## WESTERN EUROPE

7. Soviet officials in Vienna shun trade talks with Austr	rians:
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Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has informed the American Embassy that Soviet Political Adviser Kudryavtsev, whom he met at the Vienna Trade Fair, professed no

knowledge of an Austrian note offering to open trade negotiations. Neither he nor any other Soviet official showed any desire to talk about possible Austro-Soviet trade.

The Austrian Foreign Ministry interprets this as evidence that its note thwarted Soviet plans for an intensive propaganda barrage on behalf of East-West trade. If this barrage should later materialize, the Austrians believe that release of the Austrian note will "demolish" the Soviet position.

Comment: It is too early to determine the probable Soviet reaction to the Austrian note. The Austrian Foreign Ministry, which disregarded American objections in making the offer, is anxious to demonstrate that its action has had favorable consequences.

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